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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the cost efficiency of German local governments in the state of 
Baden-Württemberg in 2004 using a stochastic frontier approach. Besides being the first study 
on German data, we add two elements to the literature. First, we provide a comparative 
perspective, allowing us to embed our results in the broader literature. Second, unlike most 
previous studies, we explicitly account for exogenous or non-discretionary influences when 
estimating municipal efficiency scores. The results suggest that disregarding such exogenous 
factors can lead to significant and systematic bias in the estimated inefficiency levels. 
Particularly, underestimation of efficiency occurs for municipalities with high tourist activity, 
while the reverse is true for municipalities with high unemployment. 
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1. Introduction 
While voters appreciate the provision of public goods, they often are much more reluctant to 
finance these goods when their tax bill arrives. The literature on vote and popularity 
functions, for example, clearly illustrates that taxation has a significant political cost for 
incumbents in the sense that it reduces their popularity or re-election odds (e.g., Niskanen, 
1975; Peltzman, 1992; Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006; Geys and Vermeir, 2008a, b; Geys, 
2010). This desire for public goods but reluctance to pay for them suggests that an efficient 
provision of public goods and services – understood in terms of a maximum amount of public 
good provision at given (fiscal) costs (or ‘value for money’) – is likely to win voters’ hearts.1 
As a result, government efficiency may be an important strategic tool for governments 
wishing to attract mobile factors of production.2
 
 Moreover, arguments in favour of fiscal 
decentralisation often implicitly depend on the efficiency of local governments’ public good 
provision.  Indeed, the economic benefits from a further decentralisation of tasks are likely to 
be negligible when tasks are shifted to inefficient local governments (see also Geys and 
Moesen, 2009a). 
Despite this wide-ranging interest in efficient governments, studies measuring the efficiency 
of the public sector have thus far mainly focused on efficiency in particular areas of public 
good provision such as waste collection, police services, road maintenance, public libraries 
and so on (for reviews, see De Borger and Kerstens, 2000, and Worthington and Dollery, 
2000). Still, exceptions exist in which researchers regard the overall performance of local-
level (surveyed below) or higher-level governments (e.g., Afonso et al., 2005, 2010). Such 
‘composite’ approaches do not restrict their attention to one specific public good, but rather 
allow for a more general view on government performance. Although they are more difficult 
to implement than single policy analyses, they have the explicit benefit of allowing an 
assessment of how effectively a government is performing its multitude of tasks (rather than 
one specific task). 
 
                                                 
1  Obviously, voters might also care about government effectiveness, equity, responsiveness, adequateness, 
appropriateness, and so on (Dunn, 2004, 223-231).  In this paper, however, we concentrate on one single 
aspect of government provision: namely, its efficiency. 
2  The existence of geographic patterns in government efficiency in Belgium and Norway suggests that such 
competition is indeed at play (see Geys, 2006; Revelli and Tovmo, 2007). Moreover, the strategic importance 
of government efficiency is often implicitly acknowledged in theoretical models of tax and yardstick 
competition.  The reason is that such models generally normalise the provision of public goods to one (cf. 
Besley and Case, 1995; Revelli, 2002; Geys and Vermeir, 2008c), which implies that “lower cost of provision 
can be interpreted as higher government efficiency” (Geys and Vermeir, 2008c, 472). 
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The present study adds to the literature assessing overall government performance in three 
ways.  
 First, we focus on local governments in Germany (using a cross-section of 1015 German 
municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg for the year 2004). This setting has two 
main advantages: (1) the institutional setting is the same for all municipalities such that our 
analysis is unaffected by the institutional design of local governments, and (2) labour and 
capital costs are largely identical across the municipalities of one state such that factor price 
divergence – apart from property prices (for which we include a control variable) – is not an 
issue (which is important since the efficiency analysis is based on a cost function approach). 
Specifically, interest rate homogeneity is given by the fact that a) all municipalities have 
access to the same capital market and b) the federal government guarantees the absence of 
differences in risk premiums for all German jurisdictions. Wage homogeneity is guaranteed 
via uniform collective labour agreements.3
 Second, unlike previous studies, we provide an explicitly comparative perspective in the 
sense that we embed our results in the broader literature. While the efficiency levels 
estimated depend on the sample employed (and thus are not comparable across countries), 
important insights can nonetheless be gained from comparing the distribution of efficiency 
across various countries.  
  
 Finally, we estimate municipal efficiency while explicitly accounting for exogenous or non-
discretionary influences in the municipalities using the ‘one-step procedure’ proposed by 
Battese and Coelli (1995). This not only provides a more appropriate measure of local 
government efficiency, it also yields insights into the socio-economic and political 
influences on local government efficiency (in Germany).4
 
  
The results of our analysis show that, on average, German municipalities produce their output 
with costs approximately 21% to 24% above the efficient frontier. Controlling for background 
variables, this reduces to approximately 13% to 16%. This reduction in the average level of 
                                                 
3  A new collective wage agreement for public service at the municipal level (Tarifvertrag für den öffentlichen 
Dienst der Kommunen) became effective in 2005. This agreement allows for performance-oriented wages and 
thus undermines wage homogeneity, which is the reason our most recent data concern the year 2004. 
4  With the exception of Tanaka (2006), Geys and Moesen (2009b), Geys et al. (2010), Kalb (2010) previous 
studies of global local government efficiency use a two-step approach to explore how socio-economic and 
political influences affect efficiency (e.g., De Borger et al., 1994; Borge et al., 2008). They first estimate 
efficiency, and then asses how this result is affected by various socio-economic and political variables. This, 
however, has two downsides. First, it does not correct the efficiency estimates for the influence of these 
external forces. Second, recovering significant effects for the background variables in the second stage violates 
the assumption that the error term in the first stage is independent and identically distributed – leading to 
biased estimation results (see Kumbhakar et al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991). 
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observed inefficiency by about one third indicates the importance of correcting the estimated 
efficiency levels for exogenous or non-discretionary influences. Although comparing these 
findings with results from other countries is complicated by various heterogeneity issues (e.g. 
different time periods, analytical tools, methodologies and input/output measures employed 
throughout the literature; see also below), the average German municipality appears to lag 
somewhat further behind the best-performing German municipalities than the average 
Australian, American, Belgian, Greek or Japanese municipality lags behind the ‘best practice’ 
in their respective countries. The reverse holds in comparison to Norway, Spain and Portugal. 
Note, importantly, that since efficiency is estimated based on the decision-making units 
within a given dataset and does not constitute an absolute indicator, one cannot interpret our 
findings as stating that German municipalities are less efficient than, say, Australian ones, but 
more efficient than, say, Japanese ones. It may indeed well be that the most efficient 
Australian (Japanese) municipalities are much less (more) efficient than the most efficient 
German ones, but this is impossible to evaluate using the employed methodologies (this will 
become clearer when we discuss the methodology in more detail in section 3.2). Hence, one 
can only make comparative statements regarding the distance between the most efficient 
municipalities in a given country (which are determined within the country-specific sample) 
and non-efficient municipalities. Finally, with respect to the effect of the exogenous 
municipality characteristics, we find that costs increase (and efficiency this is underestimated) 
with population density and touristic attraction, while the reverse is true for municipalities 
with high unemployment.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an extensive overview of 
the existing empirical literature on ‘composite’ local governments’ technical or cost 
efficiency. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis including the methodological approach 
used and an introduction to the institutional setting of the local governments in German state 
of Baden-Württemberg. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 4. 
 
2. Literature review 
As mentioned in the introduction, studies on the (in)efficiency of the public sector tend to 
concentrate on one particular area of public goods provision: say, waste collection, 
administration, road maintenance, public libraries, and so on (see De Borger and Kerstens, 
2000; Worthington and Dollery, 2000; Hammond, 2002; Kalb, 2009). While interesting in 
their own right, such sector-specific studies do not allow determining overall local 
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government efficiency.  In effect, concentrating on “one particular element of service 
provision may be inadequate (or even misleading)” (Ashworth et al., 2006, 12) when the 
intention is to evaluate public sector performance more generally.  The reason, obviously, is 
that local governments may specialize in certain areas of service provision (e.g., due to a 
particular socio-economic composition of the population), and score much better in this 
particular field than on various other segments of their public good provision. To evaluate 
overall local government efficiency, various aspects of local government service provision 
should be included in the analysis.  Interestingly, such ‘composite’ approaches to local 
government efficiency have attracted only limited attention in the past and existing analyses 
are restricted to a rather small sample of countries. Table 1 provides an extensive review of 
this literature. 
 
Looking first at Australia, Worthington (2000) investigates the cost efficiency of 177 local 
governments using both Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and a stochastic frontier approach 
(SFA).5
 
 It is shown that the mean efficiency score of the Australian municipalities is about 
0.70 when using the DEA approach, indicating that the average Australian municipality could 
become (overall technically) efficient by reducing inputs (or costs) to approximately 70% of 
their current level. The SFA-scores suggest an average efficiency score of circa 0.87. Roughly 
similar findings are presented for Greece by Athanassopoulus and Triantis (1998), although 
the average efficiency levels are slightly lower for the Greek municipalities. In fact, the mean 
efficiency scores range from 0.60 when using DEA and 0.85 when using SFA. A similar 
difference in efficiency depending on the estimation method is also found in the high number 
of studies on Belgium. In this case, methods employed include COLS (i.e. ‘Corrected 
Ordinary Least Squares’), FDH (Free Disposal Hull), DEA and SFA and the mean efficiency 
scores range from 0.50 to 0.97 depending on the method used. In this case, the SFA-scores 
suggest an average efficiency of circa 0.86.  
Both existing studies of Brazilian municipalities (Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos, 1999; 
Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic, 2005) employ DEA and FDH methods. Although the two 
Brazilian datasets are ten years apart (i.e. 1991 and 2001 respectively), the conclusions are 
very similar.  In both cases, smaller cities in Brazil tend to be less efficient than larger ones, 
while average efficiency tends to be relatively high low. Interestingly, Sampaio de Sousa and 
Stosic (2005) apply a “Jackstrap” approach in some calculations (i.e. a combination of 
                                                 
5  These methods are discussed in more detail in section 3.2.  
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bootstrap and jackknife resampling methods) to reduce the effect of outliers and possible 
errors in the sample. This has an important upward effect on estimated efficiency levels.  
 
Investigations on the technical or cost efficiency of the local governments of Finland, Korea 
and Portugal rely exclusively on DEA methods. The results show that the mean efficiency 
scores are very high in Finland (0.86 to 0.90 depending on the specification) and quite low in 
Portugal (0.23 to 0.73 depending on specification and sample). The Korean results vary 
drastically depending on the number of outputs included (although this is not very surprising 
given that DEA is quite sensitive to the number of inputs and outputs employed). In contrast, 
the only Japanese study, Tanaka (2006), employs only SFA and reports an average efficiency 
score of around 0.89. Importantly, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
directly control for the exogenous environment when estimating local government efficiency 
(Geys and Moesen, 2009b, Geys et al., 2010 and Kalb, 2010 recently followed this example). 
We will return to this below. 
 
Four studies regard municipal efficiency in Spain: Gimenez and Prior (2007), Balaguer-Coll 
et al. (2007), Balaguer-Coll and Prior (2009), and Benito at al. (2010). The authors of all four 
studies use non-parametric (mainly DEA) estimation methods to investigate the technical 
efficiency of the Spanish municipalities. The results of these studies suggest efficiency ratings 
averaging to approximately 0.32 and 0.90 depending on the area under investigation (police, 
culture, etc.) and the specification used. Likewise, there are two studies on the US.  Grosskopf 
and Hayes (1993) estimate Shepard-type distance functions for 154 municipalities in Illinois 
for the years 1982 to 1986, and show that inputs could be reduced by approximately 10% 
(given output levels). Grossman et al. (1999) examine 49 U.S. central cities using an SFA 
approach. Levels of technical efficiency in this sample vary between 0.45 and 0.97. Finally, 
one study analyses 362 to 384 Norwegian municipalities over the 2001-2005 period (Borge et 
al., 2008). Defining efficiency by relating total government revenues to a constructed measure 
of output, this inquiry illustrates that average output is approximately 35% below the most 
efficient level in the sample. 
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Table 1: Studies on local governments’ cost or technical efficiency (composite approaches) 
Author(s) Method Sample Inputs (I) and Outputs (O) Main findings 
Australia 
Worthington (2000) DEA, SFA 177 New South Wales 
local governments in 
1993 
I: Number of full-time equivalent employees, other 
physical expenses, financial expenses; input prices: 
Average municipal salary, physical expenditures 
divided by current assets, average interest rate paid on 
borrowed funds 
O: Population, properties receiving domestic waste 
management services, sewerage services and water 
services, length of urban and rural roads 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.70 (DEA) to 
0.87 (SFA) 
Belgium 
De Borger and Kerstens 
(1996a) 
DEA, FDH, 
COLS, SFA 
589 Belgian local 
governments in 1985 
I: Total expenditures 
O: Number of beneficiaries of minimal subsistence 
grants and students enlisted in local primary schools, 
surface of public recreation facilities, total 
population, fraction of population older than 65 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.57 (COLS) to 
0.94 (FDH) 
De Borger and Kerstens 
(1996b) 
FDH 589 Belgian local 
governments in 1985 
I: Total expenditures 
O: Surface of municipal roads + outputs of De Borger 
and Kerstens (1996a) 
Mean efficiency scores 
between 0.81 to 0.97 
depending on specification 
De Borger et al. (1994) FDH 589 Belgian local 
governments in 1985 
I: Number of white-collar and blue-collar municipal 
employees, capital stock 
O: Municipal road surface, Number of subsistence 
grants and students in local primary schools, surface 
of public recreation facilities, ratio of non-residents to 
residents in municipality 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.86 to 0.95 
depending on specification 
Geys (2006) SFA 304 Flemish local 
governments in 2000 
I: Total current expenditures 
O: Number of subsistence grants and students in local 
primary schools, surface of public recreational 
facilities, total length of municipal roads, share of 
municipal waste collected 
Output can on average be 
increased 14% compared 
to most efficient 
Geys and Moesen (2009a) DEA, FDH, 
SFA 
304 Flemish local 
governments in 2000 
I: Total current expenditures 
O: Number of subsistence grants and students in local 
primary schools, surface of public recreational 
facilities, total length of municipal roads, share of 
municipal waste collected 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.50 (DEA) to 
0.95 (FDH) and 0.86 
(SFA) 
Geys and Moesen (2009b) SFA 304 Flemish local 
governments in 2000 
I: Total current expenditures 
O: Number of subsistence grants and students in local 
primary schools, surface of public recreational 
facilities, total length of municipal roads, share of 
municipal waste collected 
Mean efficiency score 
equals 0.86 (before 
accounting for exogenous 
controls) 
Vanden Eeckaut et al. (1993) DEA, FDH 235 Walloon 
municipalities in 1986 
I: Total expenditures 
O: Length of municipal roads, Number of subsistence 
grants and students in local primary schools, total 
population, number of persons aged 65 and more, 
number of crimes registered 
80% (20%) of the 
municipalities are efficient 
under FDH (DEA) 
Brazil 
Sampaio de Sousa and Ramos 
(1999) 
DEA, FDH 3756 Brazilian 
municipalities in 1991 
I: Current spending 
O: Total resident  population, domiciles with access 
to safe water, domiciles served by garbage collection, 
illiterate population, enrolment in primary and 
secondary municipal schools 
Smaller municipalities are 
less efficient in the 
provision of public goods 
and services than bigger 
municipalities 
Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic 
(2005) 
DEA with 
“jackstrap”, 
FDH 
4796 Brazilian 
municipalities in 2001 
I: Current spending, number of teachers, rate on 
infant mortality, hospital and health services 
O: Total and literate population, enrolment per 
school, student attendance per school, students who 
get promoted to the next grade per school, students in 
right grade per school, households with access to safe 
water, sewage system and garbage collection 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.52 (DEA) to 
0.92 (FDH) 
Finland 
Loikkanen and Susiluoto 
(2005) 
DEA 353 Finish 
municipalities from 
1994-2002 
I: Sum of the net operating costs of providing health 
and social services, culture and education (evaluated 
at 1995 prices) 
O: Children’s day care centres, children’s family day 
care, open basic health care, dental care, bed wards in 
basic health care, institutional care of the elderly and 
handicapped, comprehensive schools, senior 
secondary schools, municipal libraries 
Averages of the annual 
median efficiency scores 
range from 0.86 to 0.90 
depending on the 
specification used 
Greece 
Athanassopoulus and Triantis 
(1998) 
DEA, SFA 172 Greek 
municipalities in 1986 
I: Operating costs (expenditures on services, salaries, 
maintenance and material) 
O: Actual households, average house area, heavy 
industrial use area, tourist areas 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.60 (DEA) to 
0.85 (SFA) 
Japan 
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Tanaka (2006) SFA 317 Japanese 
municipalities in Kinki 
Area in 2001 
I: Sum of labour, capital and non-personnel costs 
O: social assistance spending per household, children 
per nursery school, teacher-student ratio, length of 
road per area, municipal waste per capita, building 
fire per capita, population, area, share of <15, share of 
>65, labour input price 
Inputs could be reduced by 
about 12% on average 
(after accounting for 
exogenous controls) 
Korea 
Sung (2007) DEA 222 Korean local 
governments from 
1999-2001 
I: Local servants per 100 persons, annual constant 
expenditures per capita 
O: Penetration rate of water supply, area of urban 
parks, ratio of road length to area, registered motor 
vehicles, sewage and refuse disposal, seating capacity 
of social welfare institutions, basic livelihood security 
recipients, building construction permits, civil affair 
and petition cases 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.57 to 0.99 
depending on the 
specification used 
Norway 
Borge et al., 2008 Ratio 362-384 Norwegian 
municipalities from 
2001-2005 
I: local government revenue 
O: constructed measure of aggregate output 
Average output 35% below 
most efficient 
Portugal 
Afonso and Fernandes (2006) DEA 51 Portuguese 
municipalities in 2001 
I: Total per-capita expenditures 
O: Calculation of a single municipal performance 
indicator from several municipal services 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.33 to 0.73 
depending on the 
specification used 
Afonso and Fernandes (2008) DEA 278 Portuguese 
municipalities in 2001 
I: Total per-capita expenditures 
O: Calculation of a single municipal performance 
indicator from several municipal services 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.23 to 0.65 
depending on  region and 
specification  
Spain 
Gimenez and Prior (2007) Non-convex 
frontier 
methods 
258 Spanish local 
governments (located in 
Catalonia) in 1996 
I: Material consumption and service acquisition, 
current transfers to decentralised organisations, total 
labour cost 
O: Urban area, total population, number of cars, 
number of buildings, ordinary refuse 
The cost level of 
inefficient municipalities is 
on average 25% higher 
than the efficient level 
Balaguer-Coll et al. (2007) 
 
DEA, FDH 414 Spanish local 
governments (located in 
Valencia) in 1995 
I: wages and salaries, spending on goods and 
services, current and capital transfers, capital 
expenditures 
O: Number of lighting points, population, waste 
collected, street surface area, public park area, quality 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.53 to 0.90 
depending on the 
specification used. 
Balaguer-Coll and Prior 
(2009) 
DEA 258 Spanish local 
governments from 
1992-1995 
I: Total expenditures 
O: Number of lighting points, population, waste 
collected, street infrastructure surface area, surface 
area of public parks 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.62 to 0.76 
depending on the 
specification used. 
Benito et al. (2010) DEA 31 Spanish local 
governments (located in 
the Region Murcia) in 
2002 
I: Costs of personnel, current consumptions, current 
transfers 
O: Different output indicators for the following areas 
of public good provision: police, culture, sports, 
green areas, refuse collection and water supply 
Mean efficiency scores 
range from 0.32 to 0.84 
depending on the area of 
public good provision. 
United States 
Grosskopf and Hayes (1993) Shepard-type 
distance 
function 
154 municipalities in 
Illinois from 1982-1986 
I: Weighted average salary for all uniformed 
employees (labour input), average yielded rates for 
the bond rating reported for the municipality (capital 
price) 
O: Ratio of population to crimes committed, median 
housing value in each municipality 
Inputs could be reduced by 
more than 10% on average 
Grossman et al. (1999) SFA 
(production 
function) 
49 U.S. central cities for 
the years 1967, 1973, 
1977 and 1982 
I: Total real market value of property tax base, 
classified property tax system, personal property in 
property base, total real municipal expenditures, total 
real expenditures on education, homes built in last 
decade, area, employment, African American 
population, median real income, intergovernmental 
real revenue, real non-property tax plus sales tax 
revenues, overlapping real state/county taxes, local 
real fee revenue, number of homes 
O: Aggregate market value of residential and business 
property 
Technical efficiency varies 
between 0.45 and 0.97  
Note:  COLS = Corrected ordinary least squares, DEA = Data Envelopment Analysis, FDH = Free Disposable Hull, SFA = Stochastic frontier analysis 
 
To sum up, the existing literature on the ‘composite’ technical or cost efficiency of local 
governments suggests that substantial inefficiencies exist in the provision of public goods and 
services by local governments. While this is a consistent finding, the difference in average 
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municipal efficiency – i.e. the efficiency level of the average municipality as compared to the 
country- and sample-specific ‘best practice’ – varies significantly across countries. One 
shortcoming of most of this literature, however, is the failure to account for exogenous or 
non-discretionary variables which may affect the performance of the municipalities (for 
exceptions, see Takala, 2006; Geys and Moesen, 2009b, Geys et al., 2010 and Kalb, 2010). 
Nonetheless, as pointed out by Stevens (2005), the performance of local governments also 
“partly [depends] on the particular environment where the authority operates. … It is 
therefore useful to consider the inefficiency of an authority net of these [background] factors” 
(Stevens, 2005, 93). This implies that most previous studies are likely to have provided biased 
– and most likely inflated – estimates of local government efficiency. In the remainder of this 
study, we address the importance of incorporating the socio-economic (and political) 
environment in studies of local government efficiency in order to draw more accurate 
inferences.  We do so using a sample of 1015 German municipalities. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 German local institutional setting 
The German state Baden-Württemberg lies in the southwest of Germany and, after two 
municipal mergers in 2006 and 2007, consists of 1109 municipalities ranging in size from 
approximately 100 inhabitants in the smallest municipality (Böllen) to almost 600,000 
inhabitants in the largest one (Stuttgart). In each case, the local government is composed of 
two political institutions: (1) the local council which is elected every five years and 
constitutes the main decision-making body of the municipality, and (2) the mayor who is 
directly elected for an eight-year term. Both institutions have their own statutory 
responsibilities, which are the same across all municipalities.  
 
Though the municipalities constitute the lowest level of government in Germany, they have 
considerable autonomy in raising revenue and assume significant responsibilities at the 
expenditure side. Table 2 shows the most important revenue and expenditure categories of the 
municipalities as a percentage of total revenues and total expenditures respectively (for the 
year 2004). This reveals that local governments have three main income sources: Tax revenue 
(43.62% of total revenue), grants (from the federal and state level, from municipal 
equalization schemes, and so on; 29.18%) and revenue from user charges (9.48%). Note that 
local governments can independently decide on five types of taxes: Trade tax 
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(Gewerbesteuer), property tax (Grundsteuer), tax on keeping dogs, second residence tax and 
entertainment tax (of which the last two types are not raised by all municipalities). As can be 
seen from the bottom-left part of table 2, the trade and property tax jointly constitute more 
than half of local governments’ tax revenues (47.79% and 13.35%, respectively). Another 
substantial part of tax revenues originates from taxes which are divided among the federal 
government (Bund), the states (Länder) and the municipalities: i.e. 33.93% from the income 
tax and 4% from the value added tax. 
 
Table 2: Structure of municipal revenues and expenditures in 2004 (in % of total revenues (1) 
and total expenditures (2)) 
Revenues (1) Expenditures (2) 
Grants 29.18 General financial management 34.55 
User charges 9.48 Public facilities, business development 11.36 
Borrowing 2.92 Architecture, housing, traffic 9.89 
Other revenue sourcesa 14.80 Social security 11.49 
Taxes 43.62 Commercial companies, real and separate estate 6.28 
Composition of tax revenue (in % of total tax revenue): General administration 7.85 
- Trade tax 
- Property tax 
- Share of income tax 
- Share of value added tax 
- Other taxes 
47.79 
13.35 
33.93 
4.00 
0.93 
Schools 6.61 
Health, sport, recovery 5.20 
Science, research, culture 3.67 
Public safety 3.11 
  
a Other revenue sources include income from interest, administrative revenue, concession levies, support for debt service, 
shares in profit and capital gains. Note that payments between municipalities and imputed costs are not included. 
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg and own calculations 
 
The revenue obtained by local governments serves to finance three types of tasks: (1) 
Voluntary tasks (e.g., libraries, theatres, museum, public swimming pools and so on), (2) 
duties without instructions by higher-level governments as to how local governments should 
perform the tasks (e.g., construction of municipal roads, fire departments, waste disposal and 
so on), and (3) duties with instructions of higher-level governments (e.g., running of local 
police authorities).6
                                                 
6  In the latter case, the state imposes detailed regulations on how municipalities should carry out these tasks. For 
a more detailed classification and description of these tasks see Gern (2005). 
 The right-hand side of Table 2 provides a detailed overview of the 
expenditure shares of selected tasks (for the year 2004). This shows that expenditures on 
general financial management (e.g., interest and amortization repayments) account for 
roughly one third of total expenditures (34.55%). Social security (11.49%), public facilities 
and business development (11.36%), and architecture, housing and traffic (9.89%) each 
require roughly 10% of the overall budget. The remaining budget posts are of minor 
importance. 
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3.2 German local government efficiency 
3.2.1 Estimation approach 
Determining the efficiency of a given number of decision-making units (here: local 
governments) first requires the selection of a set of input-output combinations that designate 
efficient behaviour (i.e. those combinations where the inputs are most productively used). 
Then, in a second step, one can designate deviations from this ‘best practice frontier’ as 
inefficiency. Both steps can be addressed in a number of different ways (for an introduction, 
see Lovell, 1993). Specifically, the best practice frontier can be generated either 
parametrically or non-parametrically. In non-parametric approaches such as DEA (Farrell, 
1957) or FDH (De Prins et al., 1984), the frontier is created as a piecewise linear envelopment 
of the data. Parametric approaches, on the other hand, determine the best practice frontier on 
the basis of a specific functional form using econometric techniques. In evaluating deviations 
from this best practice frontier, one might interpret any deviation as inefficiency (a 
deterministic approach). This, however, is problematic since observed levels of inputs and 
outputs in real-world applications may be subject to measurement errors or stochastic 
influences. Moreover, decision-making units may differ in natural (e.g. geographical), socio-
economic (e.g. extent of unemployment etc.) or institutional restrictions, which will further 
distort the picture. To the extent that such disturbances exist, one should attempt to 
differentiate between these ‘errors’ and inefficiency by using a stochastic approach. 
 
We build on the stochastic, parametric approach of efficiency measurement developed by 
Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977). Employing a translogarithmic 
specification, a parametric frontier model can be written as (dropping subscripts for decision-
making units for convenience): 
                  lnC = α + 
ε
λβ
=
+++ ∑ ∑∑ = == uvyyy q
s
r r
s
q rqr
s
r r 1 11
lnln2
1ln , (1) 
where C designates the input indicator (which may represent the money equivalent of multiple 
inputs), y indicates the output indicators, s points to the number of outputs incorporated in the 
model and βr and λrq are parameters to be estimated.7
                                                 
7  The translogarithmic function extends the more basic Cobb-Douglas type cost or production function, and 
thereby allows for a much more general functional form (i.e. relaxing the strict functional form assumed under 
Cobb-Douglas). Specifically, in a Cobb-Douglas function, the third term on the right hand side of equation (1) 
is absent: i.e. only the (logged) levels of the outputs are included and not the squared values, nor the cross-
product terms. Obviously, the use of Cobb-Douglas versus translogarithmic functional form can be tested by 
assessing whether the coefficients λ rq are jointly significantly different from 0 (see below). 
 The crucial difference with the non-
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parametric deterministic approaches mentioned above is that this parametric method allows 
one to distinguish between the effects of measurement error and inefficiency. This is achieved 
by introducing a composed error term consisting of a symmetric component (v) (generally 
assumed to be white noise) and a one-sided non-negative component ( 0≥u ) representing 
inefficiency. The latter component is mostly assumed to follow a half-normal or a truncated 
normal distribution (cf. De Borger and Kerstens, 1996a; Méon and Weill, 2005). Both error 
components are assumed to be independent. While estimation of equation (1) provides values 
for the composed error term (v + u), Jondrow et al. (1982) show that, for any organisation i, 
the conditional distribution of ui given (vi + ui) contains all available information about ui. As 
a consequence, point estimates for the inefficiency component of any given decision-making 
unit i can be generated. One can thereby either build on the mean or the mode of this 
conditional distribution (see Jondrow et al., 1982), though both generally lead to comparable 
results in empirical applications (hence, we only report the results based on the mean of the 
conditional distribution in section 3.2.2). These point estimates indicate to what extent inputs 
can be reduced without reducing current output levels.8
 
 
Two possible problems should be mentioned. First, cost function based approaches along the 
lines of equation (1) need to account for potential heterogeneity of factor costs across the 
jurisdictions under scrutiny. Fortunately, factor price divergence is not problematic in our 
setting since the costs of labour and capital are identical for all municipalities of Baden-
Württemberg (i.e. they face the same interest rates and wages). Interest rate homogeneity is 
given by the fact that a) all municipalities have access to the same capital market and b) the 
federal government guarantees the absence of differences in risk premiums for all German 
jurisdictions. As a result, no risk premium differences occur across German jurisdictions. 
Wage homogeneity is guaranteed via uniform collective labour agreements, which, until 
2005, did not allow allows for performance-oriented wages. Consequently, the same work 
was always remunerated with the same wage (eliminating any potential wage heterogeneity). 
Moreover, we include a control variable which proxies property price divergence (see below). 
 
Secondly, the efficiency estimates as derived from equation (1) treat all municipalities on the 
same footing. However, exogenous or non-discretionary influences may shape local 
government performance (e.g., Battese and Coelli, 1995), even though the municipal 
                                                 
8  Building the best practice frontier based on the decision-making units at hand by definition implies that the 
ensuing efficiency measures are relative rather than absolute measures – and only have meaning within the 
specific sample employed. This clearly holds for all the procedures brought forward. 
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government cannot affect these elements in the short (or even long) run. Examples of such 
external forces are the geographic characteristics of the area or the socio-economic make-up 
of the population. Disregarding the effect of such background factors might well lead to an 
overestimation of government inefficiency. While previous works (at best) assess how such 
factors affect local government efficiency in a two-stage procedure (see note 3), we address 
this issue by assuming that the inefficiency term (u) in the error of equation (1) is a function 
of a set of background variables (cf. Battese and Coelli, 1995). In other words, and as 
discussed in Coelli (1996), u is “assumed to be independently distributed as truncations at 
zero of the N(mit, 2uσ ) distribution where mit = δ zit” (p. 7). In this extension, zit is a vector of 
background variables (for municipality i and time period t) which are expected to influence 
(in)efficiency and δ  is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  Hence, we estimate: 
                lnC = α + uvyyy q
s
r r
s
q rqr
s
r r
+++ ∑ ∑∑ = == 1 11 lnln21ln λβ  (2) 
                           wzu I
i ii
++= ∑ =1δγ , (3) 
 
where the error term of equation (3), w, is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution 
with zero mean and variance 2σ  (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The latter assumption assures 
that the inefficiency component u can only take values bigger than or equal to zero.9
3.2.2 Definition of variables and description of data 
 This 
extension of the empirical model corrects the derived efficiency measures for the existence of 
non-discretionary factors and, at the same time, allows us to assess how these exogenous 
variables affect local government efficiency. As discussed in section 2, this correction is 
generally disregarded in previous studies investigating the ‘composite’ performance of local 
governments. 
We employ the above approach to examine the (in)efficiency of 1015 municipalities in the 
German state Baden-Württemberg in the year 2004 (data availability precluding inclusion of 
the remaining municipalities). To determine the input, output and background variables in the 
model, we rely on the previous literature (see table 1, section 2). Following this ‘common 
standard’ has the advantage that our results are to some extent comparable with these studies. 
Specifically, we employ total (net) current primary expenditures in the municipality in 2004 
                                                 
9  Complete coverage of all relevant y and z would be required to derive the real extent of inefficiency. As data 
limitations make this unattainable, we must be cautious to equate observed ‘inefficiencies’ with realisable cost 
savings. Nevertheless, even with an incomplete coverage, u offers valuable insights in the municipalities’ 
‘value for money’. 
 15 
as our prime input variable (C). These include all spending on the current budget minus the 
difference between interest and amortization repayments and income from financial 
investments. We do not include spending from the capital budget as the fluctuating payment 
profile of large scale infrastructure projects is likely to heavily distort our cross-section based 
analysis. To measure the level of local public good provision, we include six output variables 
relating to important social, educational, recreational and infrastructure responsibilities of the 
German local governments: (a) number of students in local public schools (primary and 
secondary education), (b) number of kindergarten places,10 (c) surface of public recreational 
facilities, (d) total population, (e) share of population older than 65, and (f) number of 
employees paying social security contributions.11
 
 Clearly, these are rather crude proxies for 
the full range of services a municipality provides (as indicated in Table 2). Unfortunately, 
however, this is a common stumbling block of ‘composite’ local government efficiency 
studies (e.g., Levitt and Joyce, 1987; De Borger and Kerstens, 1996). 
Finally, and crucially, we include two sets of (exogenous or background) variables that 
describe the municipalities’ production environment and political constraints. The former is 
accounted for via population density, unemployment rate and the number of tourist-
accommodation facilities. Population density relates to the rural/urban divide and thus proxies 
the ability of the authority to concentrate local public service provision (Stevens, 2005) and 
the heterogeneity of property prices (which may affect the cost situation of municipalities). 
While high population density might entail cost advantages due to regional concentration of 
services, higher property costs in urban areas (and other problems of agglomeration) may 
render production more costly. The overall effect on municipal expenditures (and 
inefficiency) is therefore ambiguous. A similar ambiguity emerges for the unemployment rate 
since it implies a) higher spending on unemployment and housing benefits (a ‘cost effect’) 
and b) lower demand for high-cost (or high-quality) public services (demand for which is 
                                                 
10  Only the total number of public and private kindergarten places of the year 2002 was available. While it 
would clearly be preferred to use only the number of public kindergarten places, such data were not 
available. Moreover, public kindergarten places make up a large fraction of total kindergarten places (44% 
in 2002). 
11  One might wonder whether and how population size, share of elderly and social security contributors 
depend on active local public policies or tap into municipal management. Still, population in our view 
proxies the extent of administrative tasks (such as issuing various types of documents) whereas the number 
of elderly indicates service provision to the elderly (e.g., retirement homes). The number of employees 
paying social security contributions proxies for infrastructure and business development services because 
such services are associated with employment. While we agree that more direct measures of local public 
policies in these areas (e.g., number of beds in nursing homes) would be valuable, these are unfortunately 
not available. 
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likely to increase with income levels; a ‘preference effect’).12
 
 Finally, the number of tourist-
accommodation facilities is included since municipalities located in touristic regions (like the 
Black Forest or the region around Lake Constance) have a higher demand for high-quality 
public services (see Sampaio de Sousa and Stosic, 2005). An increase (decrease) in the 
number of tourist-accommodation facilities therefore is expected to increase (decrease) costs 
– and lead to an underestimation (overestimation) of efficiency if left unaccounted for. 
As political background variables, we include a measure of political fragmentation and the 
share of seats of the left-wing parties in the local council. Political fragmentation is measured 
via the Herfindahl index using the seat shares of the main national parties (CDU, FDP, SPD, 
GRÜNE) and of the so-called ‘free voter unions’.13 Specifically, it equals the inverse of the 
sum of the squared seat shares of these parties.14
3.2.3 Empirical results 
 High concentration (or low fragmentation) 
represents low political competition and is therefore expected to reduce efficiency (cf. 
Ashworth et al., 2006). The share of seats of left-wing parties measures the impact of 
ideology on technical efficiency. Although left-wing governments are generally assumed to 
favour higher spending, it is a priori not clear whether this also leads to lower efficiency. 
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in table A1 in Appendix. Note that these 
exogenous variables clearly do not fully describe the production environment of German 
municipalities, but data constraints obviously restrict our opportunities here. 
We present two sets of results. The first disregards the possible effect of the exogenous 
variables in the measurement of the local government (in)efficiency and could be seen as a 
‘baseline’ model. It also represents the common approach in the foregoing literature (see 
section 2). The second set of results includes all exogenous variables. In each case, we 
estimate both a Cobb-Douglas and translogarithmic cost functional form and assess which 
provides the best fit. The results – more particularly, the estimates regarding municipal 
(in)efficiency – for each of these estimations are brought together in table 3 (full regression 
results are provided in table A2 of the Appendix).15
                                                 
12  Note that we decided to include the variables “unemployment rate” and “population density” as exogenous 
and not as output variables to the estimation equation, since these variables can hardly be considered as the 
result of active policies of the local governments. They rather describe the environment in which the local 
governments have to make their decisions. 
 Note that, by definition, municipalities on 
13  Technically, the Herfindahl index equals the sum of the squared seat shares of each party. 
14  ‘Free voter unions’ are loose federations of persons not belonging to specific political parties and exist only 
at the local level. 
15  Note that the output variable “students in public schools” has an unexpected negative sign in Table A2. This 
could be due to the fact that municipalities receive targeted annual grants per student under the municipal 
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the best practice frontier obtain efficiency scores of one, while all other municipalities receive 
scores larger than one (to indicate their excessive cost structure). 
 
 
Table 3: Summary results for local government (in)efficiency in Baden-Württemberg in 2004 
 Cobb-Douglas Translog 
 
 
No control 
variables  
(1) 
All control 
variables 
(2) 
No control 
variables 
(3) 
All control 
variables 
(4) 
Average 1.2045 1.1340 1.1722 1.1162 
Standard deviation 0.2325 0.2314 0.1849 0.1937 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 4.4500 4.7232 4.0548 4.6086 
Number efficient 1 1 1 1 
 
Table 3 indicates that, in the absence of exogenous control variables, local governments on 
average should reduce their net current primary expenditures by approximately 17% to 20% – 
without reducing their current output levels – in order to stand at the same level as the most 
efficient German municipalities (columns 1 and 3). Compared to other countries, this distance 
between the ‘average’ and ‘best practice’ municipalities in Germany is slightly larger than in 
Australia, Belgium, Greece and the US. It is smaller, however, than in Norway, Spain or 
Portugal. While it is impossible to compare the efficiency levels across various datasets 
(given that the efficiency estimates are constructed from the particular dataset employed and 
are relative rather than absolute measures), this suggests that the German municipalities tend 
to portray a relatively large dispersion of (in)efficiency. Of course, one should be careful in 
making such inference since significant heterogeneity in terms of time periods (although a 
majority of studies in Table 1 regards one or more years in the 1999-2005 period, as does our 
own analysis), methodologies and input/output variables exists across these studies. A true 
comparative project would require a simultaneous analysis of various countries using the 
same analytical tools, time frame and variable definitions. Although a much more ambitious 
project, it would clearly constitute a very relevant research objective in future analyses. 
                                                                                                                                                        
fiscal equalisation scheme in order to equalise the differences in spending among the municipalities (see 
also Ministry of Finance of Baden-Württemberg, 2006, p. 39). Since schools are located (mainly) in larger 
municipalities, the subsidy received for an additional pupil might actually exceed the marginal cost for this 
pupil (e.g., due to decreasing fixed costs); this would lead to an (overall) negative effect of the variable 
“students in public schools”. Note also that the baseline effects of the variables “kindergarten places” and 
“surface of public recreational facilities” remain statistically insignificant. Yet, the majority of the 
interaction terms including either of these variables are highly significant, underlining the importance of the 
inclusion of these variables in the estimation model (as well as the use of the translogarithmic approach to 
pick up non-linearities and interaction effects). 
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Importantly, once we include the exogenous control variables (see columns 2 and 4), 
estimated inefficiency substantially declines. In this case, the average municipality now only 
needs to reduce costs with 11% to 13% to settle itself on the ‘best practice’ frontier (slightly 
above the Japanese and Belgian estimates; see section 2). This constitutes a reduction by 
about one third. Although we should be cautious to equate these inefficiencies with potential 
cost cuts (see note 9), it is clear that ignoring the potential impact of exogenous constraints 
can have a significant effect on the inferences from the model. Moreover, the bias from 
disregarding exogenous constraints not only affects the estimated level of inefficiency, it also 
has a strong impact on the heterogeneity of German local governments’ ‘value for money’. 
This variation is represented in figure 1, where we show the number of municipalities (on the 
y-axis) with a given level of inefficiency (on the x-axis) using the results from the 
translogarithmic specifications. Light-grey cubes reflect the distribution when disregarding 
control variables, black cubes give the distribution when controlling for background variables. 
Clearly, the mass of the distribution shifts powerfully towards the left (i.e. towards higher 
efficiency) when controlling for exogenous influences, and centers more strongly around 
these low-inefficiency values. Also, while the tail of the distribution does not get shorter, it 
gets noticeably thinner (thus supporting the decrease in the standard deviation reported in 
table 3). 
  
Figure 1: Baden-Württemberg local governments’ cost inefficiency in 2004 
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Note: Results based on translogarithmic cost function. 
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Before we conclude this section, we briefly describe the findings for the non-discretionary 
variables included in the model (see table A2 of Appendix A for details). As mentioned, 
including these exogenous variables not only provides a ‘corrected’ measure of local 
government efficiency, it also yields insights into the socio-economic and political influences 
on local government efficiency in Germany. Specifically, our results show that the 
unemployment rate has a statistically significant negative sign, suggesting that the preference 
effect (i.e. reduced demand for high quality public goods) outweighs the cost effect (i.e. 
higher spending on unemployment-related benefits).16
 
 The effect of population density, on the 
other hand, is not clear, since in the translogarithmic specification the cost disadvantages 
resulting from, say, higher property prices appear to outweigh agglomeration advantages, 
whereas in the Cobb-Douglas specification it is the other way round. The statistically 
significant positive effect of tourist-accommodation facilities indicates that more touristic 
regions have a higher demand for high-quality services (in line with theoretical expectations). 
Finally, concerning the political constraints, it is found that high levels of political 
concentration or monopolization (i.e. low values for the Herfindahl index) are associated with 
low efficiency; this effect is highly statistically significant in both specifications. On the other 
hand, an increasing share of seats of left-wing parties in the local council seems to decrease 
efficiency; the coefficient is, however, only significant in the Cobb-Douglas specification. 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated the cost efficiency of German local governments in the state of 
Baden-Württemberg in 2004, and put the results in a comparative perspective. Moreover, we 
explicitly account for exogenous, non-discretionary factors when estimating (in)efficiency. 
This, in contrast to most previous work, not only provides a more appropriate measure of 
local government efficiency, it also yields insights into the socio-economic and political 
influences on local government efficiency (in Germany).  Our results indicate that the average 
municipality in Baden-Württemberg produces its output at costs that are 17% to 20% higher 
than the ‘best practice’ – or 11% to 13% once we control for the exogenous or non-
discretionary constraints on municipal production. This leads to two conclusions.  First, in 
                                                 
16  Note that there are two administrative units at the local government level in Germany (i.e. counties and 
municipalities), both of which have their own responsibilities. Counties constitute the higher administrative 
level; they are associations of a fixed number of municipalities. Since it is mainly the responsibility of the 
counties – and not of the municipalities – to finance housing and/or welfare benefits to the unemployed, 
another possible reason for the negative sign of the variable “unemployment rate” could be that the 
counties are the main bearers of the costs for the unemployed (and not the municipalities). 
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relation to previous work, the distance between the ‘average’ and ‘best practice’ 
municipalities in Germany is somewhat larger than in Australia, Belgium, Greece, Japan and 
the US. It is smaller, however, than in Norway, Spain or Portugal. Although suggestive, one 
should keep in mind here that heterogeneity across studies in terms of time periods, 
methodologies and input/output variables makes a strong interpretation of these differences 
inadvisable. A true comparative project – i.e. a simultaneous analysis of various countries 
using the same analytical tools, time frame and variable definitions – remains a relevant, 
though ambitious, research objective for future work. Second, the strong reduction in 
measured (in)efficiency once controlling for exogenous constraints convincingly illustrates 
that the modeling of such production constraints should be an indispensable element in 
‘composite’ efficiency analyses. Disregarding these background variables leads to an 
excessively unfavorable view of public sector efficiency.  
 
Although, compared to most former studies, our approach provides a more realistic 
quantification of (in)efficiency, we have indicated throughout the manuscript that one should 
nevertheless be careful to equate the estimated inefficiencies with potential cost cuts for four 
reasons. First, the output indicators employed in this study are rather crude proxies for the full 
range of services a municipality provides. While a common stumbling block of ‘composite’ 
local government efficiency studies, future research should try to augment the output side by 
incorporating information on quality indicators (resulting, for example, from surveys 
concerning citizens’ satisfaction with municipal services). Second, we do not establish a ‘true’ 
best-practice frontier, but rather generate it from the data. This implies there is no a priori 
definition of ‘best practice’, but rather one that is inferred form the observations employed. 
Unless a commonly accepted theoretical definition and operationalisation of ‘efficient 
behaviour’ can be agreed upon, it is hard to see how this natural limitation of any real world 
dataset could be overcome in future. Third, we clearly do not fully describe the production 
environment of German municipalities, but data constraints are an obvious restriction on how 
far one can go in this respect. Finally, a replication (and extension) of the analysis relying on 
sufficiently lengthy time-series cross-section data would allow incorporation of time trends 
and additional controls for fixed municipality-specific effects.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics (1015 municipalities for the year 2004) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Input variable:     
Net current primary expenditures  
(in million euros) 20.80 83.30 0.36 2080.00 
Output variables:     
Students in public schools 629.55 1261.87 0 25774 
Kindergarten places 403.28 807.00 25 17195 
Surface of public recreational facilities (in are) 2557.66 5969.37 0 110841 
Total population 10418.54 26674.55 247 589231 
Share of population older than 65 17.04 2.53 8.57 35.62 
Number of employees paying social security 
contributions (at place of work) 3664.61 14511.83 10 344311 
Other control variables:     
Unemployment rate (in %) 6.55 1.12 3.75 11.35 
Population density (inhabitants per hectare) 3.35 3.35 0.21 28.42 
Accommodation facilities 6.59 11.58 0 150.00 
Herfindahl index 0.53 0.26 0.21 1 
Share of left-wing parties (SPD+GRÜNE) 
(in %) 15.78 14.35 0 57.14 
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg 
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Table A2: Results of the multi-output frontier estimation 
Variable Cobb-Douglas Translog (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Stochastic Frontier 
Constant ( 0β ) 7.1603** 
(52.8036) 
7.2133** 
(57.6389) 
13.6610** 
(7.0040) 
11.9115** 
(7.5934) 
A: Students in public schools -0.0225** 
(-2.5423) 
-0.0186** 
(-2.2751) 
-0.1132 
(-0.5372) 
-0.1562 
(-0.7634) 
B: Kindergarten places 0.0108 
(0.3494) 
0.0181 
(0.6286) 
3.4725** 
(4.7262) 
3.2519** 
(5.1468) 
C: Surface of public recreational facilities 0.0114 
(1.3567) 
0.0084 
(1.2173) 
0.1497 
(0.7454) 
0.1460 
(0.7545) 
D: Total population 0.8447** 
(24.4878) 
0.8498** 
(26.3039) 
-3.7848** 
(-4.5046) 
-3.2652** 
(-4.5838) 
E: Share of population older than 65 0.0728* 
(1.8844) 
0.0769** 
(2.1005) 
0.4061 
(0.4681) 
1.1333 
(1.5511) 
F: Number of employees paying social 
security contributions 
0.1646** 
(13.8156) 
0.1521** 
(13.8627) 
1.1325** 
(4.7334) 
0.9211** 
(4.2481) 
A2   -0.0057 (-0.7986) 
-0.0056 
(-0.8227) 
B2   -0.0007 (-0.0143) 
0.0073 
(0.1616) 
C2   0.0026 (0.4061) 
0.0002 
(0.0414) 
D2   0.5131** (4.5563) 
0.4808** 
(4.6589) 
E2   -0.2352* (-1.7762) 
-0.3073** 
(-2.5293) 
F2   0.1074** (7.9511) 
0.0965** 
(7.4321) 
F * E   -0.0131 (-0.1785) 
0.0249 
(0.3716) 
F * D   -0.3956** (-6.2927) 
-0.3537** 
(-6.0459) 
F * C   0.0159 (1.0900) 
0.0118 
(0.8278) 
F * B   0.1851** (3.1404) 
0.1712** 
(3.1007) 
F * A   -0.0229* (-1.7587) 
-0.0242* 
(-1.9223) 
E * D   0.5023** (2.7232) 
0.3840** 
(2.2363) 
E * C   0.1082* (1.8086) 
0.1035* 
(1.8172) 
E * B   -0.7794** (-4.1923) 
-0.6922** 
(-4.0480) 
E * A   0.0348 (0.6076) 
0.0313 
(0.5688) 
D * C   -0.1058** (-2.0523) 
-0.1027** 
(-2.1267) 
D * B   -0.3728** (-2.4278) 
-0.3732** 
(-2.5938) 
D * A   -0.0187 (-0.4103) 
-0.0047 
(-0.1094) 
C * B   0.0445 (0.9712) 
0.0522 
(1.2326) 
C * A   0.0124 (1.0833) 
0.0138 
(1.2652) 
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Table A2 (continued): Results of the multi-output frontier estimation 
B * A   0.0576 (1.0635) 
0.0450 
(0.8731) 
Inefficiency model 
Constant ( 0δ )  -6.3782** (-2.5801)  
-3.8440** 
(-3.3920) 
Unemployment rate  -0.2057** (-2.6566)  
-0.1326** 
(-2.8109) 
Population density  0.0302** (3.7267)  
-0.0620** 
(-2.8253) 
Accommodation facilities  0.0474** (3.0251)  
0.0387** 
(3.9383) 
Herfindahl index  2.7049** (2.9643)  
1.0770** 
(3.6500) 
Share of left  0.0077** (3.2401)  
0.0008 
(0.3992) 
Sigma-squared ( 2σˆ ) 0.0730** 
(15.9550) 
0.7856** 
(2.6211) 
0.0588** 
(14.7417) 
0.5216** 
(3.6687) 
Gamma (γ ) 0.8652** 
(42.1071) 
0.9843** 
(152.2754) 
0.8361** 
(31.0693) 
0.9780** 
(156.6916) 
Log-likelihood 330.58 388.67 412.39 455.94 
Cobb-Douglas vs. translogarithmic - - 163.63 ** 134.54 ** 
Note: N = 1015. All variables are in natural logs excepting the variables of the inefficiency model; ** (*) 
denotes significance at 5% (10%) level. Cobb-Douglas vs. translogarithmic tests the restriction that the 
coefficients for all quadratic and cross products terms are jointly insignificant (and has a Chi2-distribution). The 
results are obtained using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). 
